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Womb for Rent: A Call for Pennsylvania
Legislation Legalizing and Regulating
Surrogate Parenting Agreements
I. Introduction
Today, an estimated one out of six couples in the United States
is unable to have children.' Various factors contribute to this infertil-
ity epidemic. Certain contraceptive methods,' venereal disease, in-
creased stress, and environmental pollutants can cause decreased fer-
tility.' For those couples wanting a child, coming to terms with
infertility and the inability to have a family can be an agonizing
experience.4
Adoption is not always the answer to the needs of these couples.
The waiting period for a healthy, adoptable child can be anywhere
from three to seven years. 5 This "baby shortage" is the result of the
increased availability and acceptance of contraceptives and abortion
and the lessened social stigma attached to being an unwed mother.'
Many couples are now turning to new reproductive techniques devel-
I. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46. The rate of infertility
in the United States is nearly triple what is was 20 years ago. Male deficiencies are the cause
of infertility in marriage 40% of the time, female deficiencies are the cause 40% of the time,
and the remaining 20% are caused by problems with both partners. The Saddest Epidemic,
TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 50.
2. Intrauterine devices (IUDs) greatly increase a woman's chances of contracting
splaginitis, an inflammation of the fallopian tubes, and pelvic inflammatory disease, both of
which can cause infertility. Id. at 98.
3. See Bird, Surrogate Motherhood: Hers? Yours? Ours?, CAL. LAW. Feb. 1982, at
21, 21-22; Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46, 50.
4. Noel Keane, a Dearborn, Michigan attorney, helps match infertile couples with
potential surrogate mothers. "For these couples, every day is one long ache of emptiness. They
express their disappointment in many ways, but they do not want to accept it. They cling to
their dream." KEANE, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 15 (1981). One psychologist summed up the
anguished feelings of infertile couples by saying, "Infertility hurts." Bird, supra note 3, at 21.
See also infra note 180.
5. Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323,
326 (1978). See also KEANE, supra note 4 at 29; SNOWDEN, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 29
(1981).
6. Bird, supra note 3, at 21-22; Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A Critical
Analysis of the Recent Kentucky Experience, 69 Ky. L.J. 877, 878 n.8 (1980-81). Other fac-
tors that have contributed to the shortage of adoptable babies include "recognition of constitu-
tional limits on legal discrimination predicated on illegitimate status; greater economic oppor-
tunity and child care services for single women; and changing male attitudes about child
raising roles." Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA.
L.REv. 465, 466-67 (1983).
oped to aid infertile couples. Artificial insemination,7 a practice first
used in the United States more than a century ago,8 is now a com-
monly accepted technique by which an estimated 20,000 children are
born every year.9 Reproduction through the use of in vitro fertiliza-
tion,10 more popularly known as "test-tube" reproduction, is also be-
coming an accepted method of artificial conception.1"
Perhaps the most controversial and least accepted method of ar-
tificial conception, both scientifically 1" and legally,' 3 is surrogate
motherhood.14  Although the practice of surrogate motherhood is
7. Artificial insemination is the introduction of semen into the vagina or uterus by
means of a syringe. The semen may be obtained from the husband of the woman inseminated.
This technique is known as homologous artificial insemination, or AIH. If a man other than
the woman's husband donates the sperm, the technique is called heterologous artificial insemi-
nation, or AID. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE A-306 (1984). See also
GRADWOHL's LEGAL MEDICINE 407 (Camps ed. 1976); SNOWDEN, supra note 5, at 16.
8. Dr. John Hunter, an English physician, performed the first artificial insemination
with sperm of the woman's husband in 1799. Note, Therapeutic Impregnation: Prognosis of a
Lawyer-Diagnosis of a Legislature, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1970). Artificial insemina-
tion with donor sperm was first performed by Dr. William Pancoast, a professor at Jefferson
Medical College in Philadelphia in 1884. The patient, who was unconscious and unaware of
the experiment, was inseminated with the sperm of "the best looking member of [Pancoast's]
class." FRANCOUER, UTOPIAN MOTHERHOOD: NEW TRENDS IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1-4
(1970).
9. L. Smith, Artificial Insemination: Disclosure Issues, II COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV.
87, 89 (1979). There are an estimated 10,000 to 250,000 children conceived by artificial in-
semination living in the United States and an estimated one million such children living
throughout the world. Id. at 89-90.
10. In vitro means an experimental medium other than an animal or being, such as a
test tube. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 1-91 (1984). The technique of in
vitro fertilization involves removing eggs from the ovaries of a female with a laparoscope. The
egg is fertilized outside the body of the female. When fertilization occurs, and the zygote
reaches the 16- to 32-cell stage, the embryo is implanted in the uterus of the female. Smith,
The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding. Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 639, 641 n.12 (1983).
II. The first in vitro fertilization was attempted in 1973 at Columbia-Presbyterian
Hospital in New York City. However, the physicians performing the procedure failed to obtain
permission for the procedure, and hospital authorities terminated the incubation of the em-
bryo. Comment, New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problems and a Solution, 49
TENN. L. REV. 303, 317-18 (1982).
Louise Brown, born on July 25, 1978, is the product of the first successful in vitro fertili-
zation. Test-Tube Baby: It's A Girl, TIME, August 7, 1978, at 68. Since Louise Brown's birth,
approximately 1,000 children have been born as a result of in vitro fertilization procedures
performed at nearly 200 in vitro fertilization clinics around the world. Wallis, supra note 1, at
46.
12. Dr. Ervin Nichols, director of practice activity for the American College of Obstet-
rics and Gynecology, is apprehensive about the use of surrogate mothers. "I would hate to say
there is no place for surrogate motherhood, . . . but it should be kept to an absolute mini-
mum." Wallis, supra note 1, at 52.
13. Professor Angela R. Holder, who teaches law at Yale Medical School, contends
that surrogate parenting contracts violate the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against the
sale of one person by another. "When you pay someone to have a baby ... you're buying the
baby." Goodman, New Reproduction Techniques Redefine Parenthood, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1984, at A21, col. 5.
14. A surrogate mother is a woman who agrees to be artificially inseminated with the
sperm of a man not her husband. Her ovum is fertilized in utero and she carries the child to
term. When the child is born, she relinquishes custody of the child to the natural father, the
sperm donor. See generally KEANE, supra note 4; WHITE, WHAT TO Do WHEN YOU THINK
hardly new,15 it has only recently come into the public spotlight. The
number of babies born as a result of surrogate mother arrangements
is not known because often the arrangements are made privately, as
when a sister carries a child for a sister, or a friend does so for a
friend.18 Recently, however, organizations such as Surrogate Parent-
ing Associates, Inc. in Louisville, Kentucky and Surrogate Family
Services in Dearborn, Michigan have taken an active role in match-
ing infertile couples with potential surrogate mothers throughout the
country. To date, the number of couples who have utilized these or-
ganizations is relatively small," but with the increasing awareness of
the availability of the technique and the growing pool of potential
surrogate mothers, the number of babies born as a result of surro-
gate parenting arrangements is expected to increase."8
Despite the increasing incidence of surrogate mother arrange-
ments, not one state has enacted a statute directed toward the
problems unique to this type of transaction. Because of the delicate
nature of the relationships between the parties involved in a surro-
gate parenting arrangement, legislation clearly defining the rights
and liabilities of the parties to these agreements is needed. This com-
ment explores the problems peculiar to surrogate mother agreements
and examines Pennsylvania law that may be applicable to the trans-
action. This comment further proposes legislation designed to meet
the needs of parties involved in a surrogate gestation transaction in
Pennsylvania.
II. Background
A. Who are the Parties to a Surrogate Parenting Arrangement?
To those who do not want a child or to those who have not had
You CAN'T HAVE A BABY 125-33 (1981).
15. Possibly, the first parties to a recorded surrogate motherhood agreement, although
not performed by artificial insemination, were Sarah, Abraham, and Hagar:
Now Sarah, Abraham's wife, bore him no children. She had an Egyptian maid
whose name was Hagar . . . And Sarah said to Abraham, "Behold now, the
Lord has prevented me from bearing children; go unto my maid; it may be that I
shall obtain children by her" . . . And Hagar bore Abraham a son, and Abra-
ham called the name of his son Ishmael.
Genesis 16:1, 2, 15.
16. Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Ken-
tucky Experience, 69 Ky. L.J. 877, 880 (1980-81). For an account of how one woman had a
baby for her best friend, see KEANE, supra note 4, at 57-74.
17. Of the 3.5 million births in the United States in 1978, only three involved children
born as a result of a surrogate motherhood agreement arranged by Noel Keane, founder of
Surrogate Family Services in Dearborn, Michigan. KEANE, supra note 4, at 21.
18. Comment, Parenthood by Proxy: Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth, 67 IOWA
L. REV. 385 (1982). Because the couple can obtain a child in much less time than if they had
pursued a traditional adoption, and because the resultant child will be biologically related to
the husband, surrogate parenting is an increasingly attractive reproductive alternative. Id. at
387.
difficulty having a child, the idea of surrogate mothering at first may
seem strange. What kind of people would want a child so badly that
they would seek out a woman willing to have the child for them?
Furthermore, what type of woman would decide to have a child with
the intention of giving it to someone else to raise?
For women who cannot conceive or should not conceive,' 9 or for
women unable to carry a child to term, a surrogate parenting ar-
rangement may be the woman's only hope of having a child. Adopt-
ing a child is often out of the question because the wait for a child
can be several years, and at the end of the wait there is no guarantee
that the couple will be able to adopt a child."0 Often a couple
chooses not to adopt because they have a strong desire for a child
that is in some way genetically related to the couple.2 Surrogate
motherhood offers the perfect solution for these couples. Once the
surrogate has been successfully inseminated, the couple's wait for
their child is nine months rather than several years. The arrange-
ment offers an additional advantage to the couple by producing a
baby that is the natural child of the husband. 2
Some couples are fortunate enough to have a relative or close
friend act as a surrogate for them. Other couples to whom there is
no one available or couples who would rather not disclose their deci-
sion to use a surrogate until after the baby is born must use more
formal methods to locate a potential surrogate mother. Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc. in Louisville, Kentucky and Surrogate
Family Services in Dearborn, Michigan are organizations that help
match infertile couples with potential surrogate mothers. Originally,
potential surrogates were sought by placing advertisements in local
newspapers.23 Today, Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. and Sur-
rogate Family Services receive hundreds of applications from women
across the country who would like to be surrogate mothers.2 '
Women willing to have a baby for another woman are moti-
19. Hormonal disorders, pelvic diseases, or anatomical abnormalities can prevent a wo-
man from conceiving. For a discussion of the causes of female infertility, see WHITE, supra
note 14, at 65-92.
20. See supra text accompanying note 5.
21. KEANE, supra note 4, at 29-30.
22. Establishing a biological relationship between the father and the child is important
for some couples because they can be ensured that the child will be physically and intellectu-
ally similar to the father. Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291, 293 n.4 (1982).
23. Many of the women who have acted as surrogate mothers became involved in the
arrangement by replying to classified advertisements in a newspaper. See, e.g., Wallis, A Sur-
rogate's Story, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 53; Note, supra note 16, at 884-85.
24. Dr. Richard Levin, Director of Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., claims that in
the first six months of the organization he heard "from thousands of childless couples and
several thousand women interested in becoming surrogates." Seligmann, Pregnancy by Proxy,
NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 72.
vated by a number of factors. The offer of a fee is a great enticement
for many.25 Although some women decline payment of a fee, or ask
that they only be reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenses, money
may be the primary, motivating factor for others.26 However, most
women agree to become surrogate mothers because they enjoyed be-
ing pregnant with their own children, they have found motherhood to
be a rewarding experience, and they want to help fill the emptiness
in the lives of infertile couples by sharing with them the love and
pleasure of a child.2 7 But despite all the benefits to the parties in-
volved, the legality of surrogate gestation transactions is unclear.
B. What is Surrogate Parenting?
Surrogate parenting has been described as the reverse of artifi-
cial insemination, which is an alternative method of conception com-
mon in the United States.28 Artificial insemination is most commonly
used when a couple wishes to have a child but the husband is infer-
tile.29 The wife is inseminated with the sperm of an anonymous do-
nor,30 carries the baby to term, gives birth, and retains custody of
the child. The wife is the biological mother of the baby, her husband
is the baby's legal father,3 1 and the anonymous sperm donor is the
biological father.
In the typical surrogate gestation transactions, the wife is infer-
25. Typically the surrogate mother is reimbursed for all her medical and legal ex-
penses, as well as for her maternity clothes. Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a
Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 271 (1981-82) (this article contains a sample contract used by the
author in her work with Surrogate Family Services, Inc.). Often a fee is paid to the surrogate
mother as compensation for her services. Fees normally average $5,000 to $10,000, but some
couples pay as much as $20,000. Granelli, Surrogate Mother Sued Over Custody Agreement,
3 NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 4, col. 2 (quoting Katie Brophy).
26. One woman who responded to a surrogate mother advertisement asked only that
her medical school tuition be paid for one year, A man responded to a similar advertisement
volunteering the services of his girlfriend for a fee. Hiring Mothers, TIME, June 5, 1978, at 59.
27. Franks, Psychiatric Evaluation of Women in a Surrogate Mother Program, 138
AM. J. PsycH. 1378 (1981). Some women have become surrogate mothers to alleviate guilt
feelings about a past abortion. Wallis, supra note 22, at 53.
28. See supra note 10; Note, supra note 16, at 879.
29. Artificial insemination may utilize the husband's sperm when, because of physical
barriers to conception in either the male or female, conception cannot occur through sexual
intercourse. Comment, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of
Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLIAMETTE L. J. 913, 916 (1981). Artificial insemination with
donor sperm also may be used by single women or lesbian couples who want a child. See
generally Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for
an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981).
30. See supra note 7.
31. In states that have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, the husband is the child's
legal father. Section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act provides, in pertinent part, "If, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if
he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived." UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 5
(1979). In states that have not adopted this section or a similar provision, see infra note 52,
the husband may be presumed to be the natural father, see infra note 36.
tile. The couple in this situation seeks out a woman to act as a surro-
gate for them. The identity of the surrogate mother may or may not
be known to the couple. 32 When a potential surrogate mother is
found, the parties negotiate a contract in which the couple agrees to
pay a fee for the surrogate's services in addition to reimbursement
for the surrogate's expenses. In return, the surrogate mother agrees
to be inseminated with the sperm of the infertile woman's husband,
carry the baby to term, and, upon the birth of the child, to relinquish
all her parental rights and interests in the child.33 The husband of
the infertile woman, as the biological father, takes custody of the
child and his wife later adopts the child, making her the child's legal
mother. If the surrogate mother is married,3" her husband is often
made a party to the surrogate contract for two reasons. First, by
signing the contract, he consents to the insemination of his wife with
the sperm of another man, thereby negating any subsequent claim
that the surrogate committed adultery.35 Second, because a child
born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the child of the hus-
band, 6 the relinquishment of all parental rights and interests in the
child by the husband of the surrogate mother serves to rebut that
presumption and allows the biological father to take custody of his
child.
C. The Legal Implications of the Artificial Insemination
Procedure
Artificial insemination, now a legal alternative means of concep-
tion, has not always been the subject of judicial praise. The Ontario
Supreme Court, in Orford v. Orford,37 held the process of artificial
insemination to be adulterous. The court reasoned that the purpose
of marriage is the propagation of the species; therefore, the repro-
ductive faculties of a person are to be used only for the benefit of his
32. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. requires complete anonymity between the par-
ties to a surrogate parenting arrangement. The philosophy of Surrogate Family Services, in
contrast, is that the parties should know each other. Seligmann, supra note 24, at 72.
33. For a sample surrogate contract defining the duties and obligations of each of the
parties, see Brophy, supra note 25, at 266-85.
34. A married woman is sometimes preferred as a surrogate mother to avoid the stigma
of inducing single women to become pregnant. Using only married women may make surro-
gate motherhood more acceptable to the public. Graham, supra note 22, at 293. Surrogate
Family Services, Inc. accepts married or unmarried women as surrogate mothers but requires
them to have at least one healthy child. Brophy, supra note 25, at 265. A woman who has had
a child is thought to be better able to understand the difficulties involved in giving up a child.
Graham, supra note 22, at 293 n.7.
35. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
36. "In the interest of stabilizing family relationships, there is universal acceptance of a
strong presumption of legitimacy in favor of children born in wedlock." KRAUSE, ILLEGITI-
MACY. LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 15-16 (1971).
37. 58 D.L.R. 251, 49 Ont.L.R. 15 (1921).
spouse.3 8 Sexual intercourse thus was not necessary to commit an
adulterous act. To support a claim that a woman had committed
adultery, the court held it was sufficient to show that a woman had
subjected herself to the possibility of introducing a false strain of
blood into her husband's family 9 - precisely what happens when a
woman is artificially inseminated with donor sperm.
In Doornboos v. Doornboos,'0 an Illinois superior court simi-
larly held that artificial insemination with donor sperm, with or
without the husband's consent, constitutes adultery because it "is
contrary to public policy and good morals . 14  The court noted, how-
ever, that artificial insemination with the sperm of the husband was
in accordance with good morals and public policy."'
Because courts and scholars generally agree that sexual inter-
course is a requisite element of adultery,43 artificial insemination
with donor sperm is no longer considered an adulterous act. Many
states" have also abolished the presumption that a child born as a
result of artificial insemination is illegitimate.4 5 In People v. Soren-
son,46 the California Supreme Court held that, when considering
whether a man was obligated to support a child conceived by insemi-
nation of his wife with donor sperm, the determinative factor is
whether a legal relationship exists between the man and the child,
not whether the man is the biological father.47 The court found that
the husband's consent to the insemination of his wife with donor
sperm created an obligation to support the child conceived as a result
38. Id. at 258, 49 Ont.L.R. at -.
39. Id.
40. 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (I1. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1954).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Adultery is typically defined as voluntary sexual intercourse between a married per-
son and a person other than his or her spouse. HONORC, SEX LAw 27 (1978)
It has been suggested that the doctor and the wife commit adultery by the pro-
cess of artificial insemination . . . .Since the doctor may be a woman, or the
husband himself may administer the insemination by a syringe, this is patently
absurd; to consider it an act of adultery with the donor, who at the time of the
insemination may be a thousand miles away or may even be dead, is equally
absurd.
People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal.2d 280, 289, 437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 13 (1968) (cita-
tions omitted).
44. See infra note 52.
45. New York has had a history of conflicting case law in this area. In Strnad v.
Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948), the New York Supreme Court held that a
child conceived by artificial insemination with donor sperm is not illegitimate. Fifteen years
later, that holding was overruled by Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1963). That court held that there was no legal precedent to support the result in Strnad v.
Strnad. Therefore, a child conceived by artificial insemination with donor sperm is not the
legitimate child of the husband. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d
430 (1973) overruled Gursky v. Gursky, holding that such a child is legitimate.
46. 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
47. Id. at 284, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
of the insemination. This rendered the surrogate's husband the
child's legal father. 8 The anonymous sperm donor, whom the court
likened to a kidney or blood donor, cannot be considered the natural
father of the child because he no more can be held responsible for
the use made of his sperm than the kidney donor can be held respon-
sible for the use made of his kidney or the blood donor for the use
made of his blood.4 9 A New York court, in In re Adoption of Anony-
mous,50 held that in light of the state's strong policy in favor of legit-
imacy, a child conceived by artificial insemination should not be la-
belled illegitimate.5 1 To date, twenty-six state legislatures have
enacted laws declaring the husband of a woman artificially insemi-
nated with donor sperm the legal father of the child conceived by the
process.52
Although the surrogate gestation transaction involves the artifi-
cial insemination of a woman with the sperm of a man who is not
her husband, the typical statute legitimizing a child conceived by
artificial insemination is inadequate when applied to a surrogate ges-
tation transaction. The effect of these statutes on surrogate parenting
arrangements is the exact opposite of the intent of the parties to the
transaction. If the surrogate mother is married, these statutes make
the surrogate mother's husband the legal father of the child. Obvi-
ously, the goal of a surrogate gestation agreement is to make the
natural father and his wife the legal parents of the child. This goal is
further hindered by the fact that a child born during a valid mar-
riage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband.53 With-
out legislation explicitly stating that the natural father and his wife
are the legal parents of the child, the legitimacy of the child remains
in question.
48. Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
49. Id. at 284, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
50. 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973).
51. Id. at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
52. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7005 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f
to n (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.11 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1
(1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1451 (Smith-Hurd 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129
(1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1984); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §
1-206(b)(1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5111 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56
(1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1984-85); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 49A-1 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552 (West Supp. 1984-85); OR. REv. STAT.
§§ 109.239, 109.243 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §
12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 64.1-67.1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050
(West Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1984).
53. See supra note 36.
D. The Legality of the Surrogate Contract
One of the most troublesome aspects of the surrogate gestation
transaction is the surrogate mother's fee. Critics of the transaction
contend that payment to the surrogate mother represents compensa-
tion for her agreement to terminate her parental interest and to al-
low the natural father and his wife to take custody of the child."'
The payment thus constitutes baby-selling. Most states have a stat-
ute that prohibits the payment of money in exchange for a child.
55
Pennsylvania's baby-selling statute56 makes it a misdemeanor of the
first degree to buy, sell, trade or deal in infant children. The primary
purpose of these laws is to outlaw black market baby adoptions.5"
Critics contend that a surrogate gestation transaction is contrary to
public policy because the payment of a fee endangers the child's psy-
chological well-being by treating the child as a mere commercial ob-
ject. 58 It is also argued that the wholesale use of surrogate mothers
as providers of babies is injurious to marital and family relation-
ships.5 9 Proponents of surrogate parenting agreements, however, be-
lieve that the fee is compensation for the surrogate mother's ser-
vices. 60 The payment represents the value of the risks the surrogate
mother undertook during her pregnancy and delivery. The fee is also
a necessary part of the surrogate gestation transaction because, with-
out it, the pool of potential surrogate mothers would be greatly
54. The Kentucky Attorney General has declared surrogate contracts to be illegal in
Kentucky because the payment of a fee to a surrogate mother contradicts Kentucky's strong
public policy against the buying and selling of babies. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 81-18, 7 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2246 (1981). The Michigan Court of Appeals in Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App.
169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) held that Michigan's baby-selling statute, MICH. STAT. ANN. §
27.3178(555.54) (Callaghan 1980) did not prohibit surrogate mother arrangements but did
prohibit the adopting couple from paying a fee to the surrogate mother.
55. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1970) (this statute does not make it
illegal to pay a mother's maternity expenses, as long as it is charity and is not connected with
the adoption); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1984-85) (this section expressly excludes
fees paid to adoption agencies).
56. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (1982). "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree if he deals in humanity, by trading, bartering, buying, selling, or dealing in infant
children." Id.
57. See Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147, 154
[hereinafter cited as Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood]; but see Landes &
Posner, supra note 5, at 339 (baby-selling statutes restrict the free baby market, thus increas-
ing the incidence of black market adoptions).
58. Mawdsley, Surrogate Parenthood: A Need for Legislative Direction, 71 ILL. B.J.
412, 414 (1983).
59. Id. However, strain to marital and family relationships was one of the original ob-
jections to artificial insemination. Despite the critics' fears, artificial insemination is becoming
a commonly accepted technique. It is unfair to prohibit a couple in which the wife is infertile
from having a child through a surrogate mother because of possible strain on relationships,
when couples in which the husband is infertile can have a child through artificial insemination.
Graham, supra note 22, at 303.
60. Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 373, 374
(1981). See also Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 57, at 153.
diminished.61
E. Constitutional Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood
The United States Supreme Court has held that an individual
has a fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a child.62
Although this right was originally granted to married couples, 63 the
right has been extended to unmarried adults64 and to minors.65 Free-
dom to make procreational decisions is embodied in the right to pri-
vacy. There is no specific constitutional provision guaranteeing the
right to privacy; it is considered a fundamental right, however, and
therefore is protected through the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.66
Because decisions regarding procreation go to the very core of an
individual's personal life, the right to make these decisions is highly
esteemed.
67
Proponents of surrogate gestation agreements contend that a
woman's decision to become a surrogate mother is protected by that
right.66 The right to bear or beget a child is constitutionally guaran-
teed regardless of the method employed to conceive the child., 9 The
61. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 57, at 153.
Ringing denunciations of baby-buying and declarations that children are not
property may make stirring reading, but it is difficult to specify precisely why
the "commercialization" of a surrogate motherhood arrangement is against pub-
lic policy. In a commercial society, "commercialization" is the usual way in
which many individual needs are satisfied. There is no doubt that the financial
return may motivate the surrogate mother to make her reproductive capacity
available to others . . . .What is important, however, is that the adoptive par-
ents are no more acting upon economic considerations than are married couples
who elect to have children.
Id. at 156 (footnote omitted).
62. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute providing for sterilization
of persons convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude found unconstitutional).
63.
Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1964) (statute forbidding the use of contracep-
tives held to violate the right of marital privacy).
64. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). "If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
65. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (statute prohibiting the
sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors held unconstitutional).
66. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
67. Carey, 438 U.S. at 685.
68. See, e.g., Comment, The Surrogate Child: Legal Issues and Implications for the
Future, 7 J. Juv. L. 80, 87 (1983).
69. Id. But see Note, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WOMEN's RTS. L.
REP. 107 (1982). There is a limitation on the applicability of the right of privacy. Although
women have the right to decide whether or not to bear a child, most states prohibit prostitution
and adultery. "The anomalous result is that individuals are free to decide whether or not to
fact that a surrogate mother enters into the transaction with no in-
tention of keeping the child does not alter that right. If a woman
who is in her first trimester of pregnancy has the right to terminate
that pregnancy, 70 a woman should have the right to terminate her
parental interests in a child she has not yet conceived.
Although a woman has the right to act as a surrogate mother, 1
the transaction may be regulated by the state. 72 The state arguably
has a compelling interest in regulating surrogate parenting arrange-
ments. Unlike the traditional method of conception, the decision to
have a child through a surrogate mother is more than a private deci-
sion made between two people. 7" Because states have strong public
policy favoring legitimacy 74 and prohibiting baby-selling, 75 the best
interests of the child born to a surrogate mother may be protected by.
regulating the transaction. 76  However, because such regulation
would infringe upon a constitutionally protected right,77 the state
must use the least restrictive means of regulating that interest. 78
III. Why is Surrogate Parenting Different?
There are aspects of surrogate parenthood that make it unique
bear a child, but not necessarily to engage in certain varieties of sexual intercourse to produce
a child." Id. at I11.
70. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 22, at 305-17; Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate
Motherhood, supra note 57, at 161-66.
72. "The freedom of intimate association, like other constitutional freedoms, is pre-
sumptive rather than absolute. In particular cases, it may give way to overriding governmental
interests. The freedom does not imply that the state is wholly disabled from promoting
majoritarian views of morality." Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J.
624, 627 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
73. At the basic level, a surrogate gestation transaction involves the surrogate mother
and the donor of the sperm, the natural father. However, the spouses of the surrogate mother
and the natural father also have an interest in the outcome of the arrangement. The transac-
tion also involves a physician, who performs the insemination, and often times an intermediary,
who matches the couple with the potential surrogate mother. If the surrogate mother is ob-
tained through an advertisement, then still more parties are involved. See Note, supra note 69.
74. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 54 & 55.
76. But see Graham, supra note 22.
[T~he state should neither prohibit surrogate gestation contracts, nor enforce
such contracts. If the state enforces surrogate gestation contracts through any
rule similar in result to specific performance, it is in the position of supporting
the propriety of a particular social role for women. Such support is impermissi-
ble because it is the enforcement of a value judgment that woman's procreative
ability may be properly used to satisfy the needs of other persons. Likewise, if
the state forbids surrogate gestation contracts, it places itself in the position of
denying women the right to choose a social role. In either case, the neutral
choice rule is violated.
Id. at 318 (footnotes omitted).
77. See supra note 64.
78. Comment, supra note 68, at 87. A complete prohibition of surrogate parenting ar-
rangements would be an unconstitutional infringement by the state. Id.
from other transactions through which a couple can obtain a child. 9
When a woman signs a contract promising to become pregnant by
artificial insemination and then to relinquish custody of the child to
the natural father, interesting practical and legal questions are
raised. In the absence of surrogate parenting legislation, there are no
answers to these questions.
Whether a child born as the product of a surrogate gestation
agreement is legitimate or illegitimate poses a particularly net-
tlesome question. If the surrogate mother is unmarried, then the
child could be considered illegitimate. However, the surrogate
mother's marital status may not be determinative of the question of
the child's legitimacy. A child born to a married surrogate mother
inseminated with the sperm of a man not her husband may be con-
sidered legitimate or illegitimate. Legitimacy may follow from the
legal presumption that children born to a married woman are the
children of her husband. 80 Contrarily, the mere fact that the child is
a product of artificial insemination with sperm donated by a man
other than her husband may suggest illegitimacy.
The unique nature of surrogate parenting contracts also may
strain traditional remedies. On its face, specific performance seems
an appropriate remedy when a surrogate mother refuses to give up
the child to the natural father. However, courts may be reluctant to
force a woman to give up her child.81 Likewise, money damages may
prove an inadequate balm to the wounds suffered by an adopting
couple whose months, if not years, of anticipation are abruptly
dashed. To complicate the dilemma, an award of money damages
may be construed to violate baby-selling statutes because, in a sense,
it is a payment to the natural father for the termination of his paren-
tal rights. It may not even be clear whether the surrogate mother
who decides to keep her child would be required to reimburse the
adopting couple for the payment of her medical expenses.82
Myriad problems also may arise if the natural father and his
wife refuse to accept the child for whom they have contracted.
Again, specific performance appears to be an inappropriate remedy.
The child's welfare may be jeopardized if a couple is forced to take a
79. Other than the traditional method of conception through sexual intercourse, an in-
dividual can obtain a child through adoption, artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization.
80. See supra note 36.
81. Although a child has a unique and irreplacable nature, specific performance is an
inappropriate remedy in the event of a breach of a surrogate contract. "Would a legal system
that has never required the personal performance of an opera singer or an athlete require
specific performance in this case?" Graham, supra note 22, at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
82. After all, the issue of a surrogate parenting arrangement is also the child of the
natural father. The medical expenses may be considered part of his support obligation. See
infra note 136 and accompanying text.
child they do not want. However, if the surrogate mother agrees to
raise the child, it may seem appropriate for the natural father to
contribute child support. Similarly, if the surrogate mother decides
to put the child up for adoption, the natural father seemingly would
be obligated to reimburse her for any expenses she might incur.
Additional problems arise with regard to the minimal health
care standards an adopting couple may impose upon a surrogate
mother. It is uncertain whether the adopting couple can require a
surrogate mother to undergo testing, such as amniocentesis,83 to dis-
cover genetic abnormalities. Further problems may arise if a genetic
abnormality is discovered and the adopting couple wants the surro-
gate mother to terminate the pregnancy. In the event the surrogate
mother has the baby against the couple's wishes, the adopting couple
seemingly would be obligated to pay child support or adoption costs.
Children born as a result of a surrogate parenting agreement
may someday want to know the identity of their biological mothers.
But in many surrogate transactions, the identity of the surrogate
mother remains anonymous.84 The child born to a surrogate mother,
like an adoptee, may have a right to know the surrogate mother's
identity.8 5 This right, therefore, must be balanced against the surro-
gate mother's right of privacy. Even if the child's right outweighs the
surrogate mother's right,86 without adequate record-keeping the
search for the surrogate mother's identity may be impossible.
Additional unanswered questions arise in the area of tort liabil-
ity. If a surrogate mother dies or her health becomes impaired as a
result of her pregnancy, it is unclear to what extent the adopting
couple and the physician who performed the artificial insemination
may be held liable. Furthermore, in a jurisdiction providing common
law immunity from lawsuits brought by children against their par-
ents, it may be unclear whether this immunity applies to the surro-
gate gestation transaction. If it does, the question of which woman
83. Amniocentesis is a procedure in which "a needle is inserted into the amnionic cav-
ity, and amnionic fluid is removed and analyzed to provide data on the state of the fetus."
GRAY & GORDY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 305.13(5)(3d ed. 1984).
84. The surrogate mother's constitutional right of privacy may allow her to remain
anonymous. A surrogate mother can be compared to a natural parent who puts a child up for
adoption. The sudden appearance of the child could greatly disrupt the surrogate mother's life.
See Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
1196, 1214-20 (1975).
85. See generally Note, supra note 84. Like an adoptee, a child born to a surrogate
mother may have a First Amendment right to receive information regarding his or her per-
sonal life. "The birth certificate contains information which is essential to the development of
the adoptee's sense of identity. If it is true that a sense of self-identity is a necessary prerequi-
site to effective decision making, the denial of access impairs his participation in and contribu-
tion to his society." Id. at 1207 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 1220. The Note suggests that the adult adoptee's right to know is greater
than the natural parent's right of privacy because the parent's right may be protected through
tort law for invasion of privacy.
should be protected by the immunity, the surrogate mother or the
wife of the natural father, further clouds the problem.
Because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the surrogate
gestation transaction, unusual problems can result. The questions
should be resolved delicately, and only after careful consideration,
because these issues go to the heart of the concept of family. Many
lives could be profoundly affected if society, the courts and the legis-
latures fail to consider these issues seriously. Although some courts
have already confronted these questions,8" state legislatures are bet-
ter equipped to address them. Legislation is needed that recognizes
the legality of the surrogate gestation transaction and resolves the
transaction's problems in a uniform manner.
IV. An Examination of Current Pennsylvania Law As It Relates to
the Surrogate Gestation Transaction
If a dispute arises between the parties to a surrogate gestation
agreement, a court will most likely find the contract unenforceable
because of the questionable validity of the surrogate mother's fee.88
In a case in which the contract is held to be unenforceable, the sur-
rogate mother likely will be granted custody of the child because her
husband will be presumed to be the child's natural father. This re-
sult is contrary to the intent of the parties as expressed at the time of
the contract's making. Specific state legislation recognizing the va-
lidity of a surrogate contract and regulating the surrogate gestation
transaction might eliminate custody disputes. Not only will the best
interests of the child be served by statutorily delineating his legal
status, but legislation also would protect the rights of the surrogate
mother, her husband, the natural father and his wife.
The increasing prevalence of surrogate gestation agreements has
created legal questions that previously had been considered only hy-
pothetically. 89 Legislation answering these questions is needed to
prevent the application of common law principles to these transac-
tions. Such principles are outdated because they were formulated
long before the concept of surrogate motherhood was ever contem-
plated seriously. Although no comprehensive legislation exists, laws
dealing specifically with surrogate gestation agreements have been
87. See, e.g., Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2260 (Mich. Ct. App.
Jan. 19, 1983) (petition of the natural father to establish paternity was dismissed because
surrogate parenting agreements were found to be beyond the scope of Michigan's Paternity
Act, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.491 (Callaghan 1980)); Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307
N.W.2d 438 (1981) (adopting couple is prohibited from paying a surrogate mother a fee).
88. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
89. See generally Mawdsley, supra note 58 (the author presents unanswered questions
concerning the legal aspects of surrogate motherhood).
proposed in several states.9"
A. Legalizing Artificial Insemination in Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania currently does not have a law addressing the artifi-
cial insemination procedure, nor does it have legislation legitimizing
a child conceived by artificial insemination. Pennsylvania does have
a statute, however, that recognizes the practice of in vitro fertiliza-
tion9" and requires those who perform in vitro fertilization to file
quarterly reports with the Department of Health.92 In vitro fertiliza-
tion, like artificial insemination, often involves the use of sperm from
anonymous male donors, as well as ova of anonymous female do-
nors.93 As a result, a woman who undergoes the process of in vitro
fertilization may have an embryo implanted in her uterus that has
been fertilized with sperm of a man who is not her husband. There-
fore, because in vitro fertilization is legislatively recognized in Penn-
sylvania, legislation recognizing the legality of artificial insemina-
tion, a much more common and accepted reproductive technique,9
would not be contrary to the public policy of Pennsylvania. Pennsyl-
vania's statutory recognition of artificial insemination as a legal pro-
cedure would preclude a court from holding that it is an adulterous
act. Such legislation is necessary to the continuation of the practice
of artificial insemination because adultery constitutes a ground for
divorce in Pennsylvania. 95
90. Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina have
proposed legislation legalizing and regulating surrogate parenting agreements. See RPTR. HuM.
REPRO. & L. (L-M Studies) R-72 to R-108 (1982-85).
91. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(e)(1984). 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1982) defines in
vitro fertilization as "[t]he purposeful fertilization of a human ovum outside the body of a
living human female."
92.
All persons conducting, or experimenting in, in vitro fertilization shall file quar-
terly reports with the department, which shall be available for public inspection
and copying, containing the following information:(l) Names of all persons con-
ducting or assisting in the fertilization or experimentation process;(2) Location
where fertilization or experimentation is conducted;(3) Name of any person, fa-
cility, agency or organization sponsoring the fertilization or experimentation ex-
cept the names of any persons who are donors or recipients of sperm or eggs
shall not be disclosed;(4) Number of eggs fertilized;(5) Number of fertilized
eggs destroyed or discarded;(6) Number of women emplanted with a fertilized
egg.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(e) (1982).
93. Although the in vitro fertilization procedure may utilize the sperm and ovum of the
couple desiring a child, the sperm or ovum can be obtained from a donor. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3213(e)(3) (1982) recognizes the use of donors.
94. See supra note 9.
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 201(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) provides that "it shall
be lawful for the court to grant a divorce to the innocent and injured spouse whenever it shall
be judged that the other spouse shall have committed adultery." However, if the husband
consented to the insemination, the wife may claim connivance as a defense to the adultery
charge. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 207(a)(Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
Artificial insemination is a vital part of the surrogate gestation
procedure. 96 Therefore, if artificial insemination is a prohibited act,
surrogate gestation transactions would be considered prohibited acts
as well. But legislation expressly legalizing artificial insemination
could be the first step toward recognition that surrogate parenthood
is not contrary to public policy. Surrogate parenthood could be seen
as a logical extension of a statutorily recognized artificial insemina-
tion procedure. Yet legislative recognition of artificial insemination is
not a prerequisite to a statute recognizing the surrogate gestation
transaction. Rhode Island and South Carolina currently do not have
laws addressing artificial insemination, but both states are consider-
ing legislation that would legalize and regulate surrogate gestation
agreements.97 Therefore, it would not be unprecedented if Pennsyl-
vania enacted legislation recognizing surrogate parenting agreements
in the absence of legislation addressing artificial insemination.
B. Pennsylvania's Baby-Selling Statute
If a dispute were to arise between the parties to a surrogate contract
in Pennsylvania today, the presently enacted laws would be inade-
quate to resolve the dispute properly.98 The surrogate contract would
most likely be held invalid because, if the surrogate were to receive
compensation under the contract, she would violate Pennsylvania's
baby-selling statute.99 Payment to a surrogate has been construed by
other courts as payment for the child rather than payment for the
surrogate's services. 100 If a surrogate gestation transaction were simi-
larly interpreted in Pennsylvania as being the purchase of a child,
the parties to the surrogate contract, and perhaps the physician who
performed the artificial insemination as well, would be guilty of a
first degree misdemeanor under Pennsylvania's baby-selling statute.
96. Without the artificial insemination of the surrogate mother, there can be no con-
ception. Artificial insemination is utilized because the natural father and the surrogate mother
are not married to one another.
97. See supra note 90, at R-99 to R-108. But see id. at R-93 (New Jersey's proposed
legislation prohibiting surrogate mother arrangements).
98. No state, including Pennsylvania, has legislation directly addressing surrogate ges-
tation arrangements. The task of applying current case law and statutes to surrogate transac-
tions has been described by one commentator as "similar to the proverbial placing of square
pegs in round holes." Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects
of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 468 (1982).
Contract law is more at home in the business world than in the nursery; artificial
insemination statutes were designed to legitimize, not bastardize, a child; and
adoption procedures were established to facilitate giving up an unwanted child
rather than to orchestrate its conception. The law in these substantive areas is
simply not designed to meet the needs of surrogate agreements.
id.
99. See supra note 56.
100. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
Because contracts for illegal actions are void and unenforceable,' 0'
any provisions in the surrogate contract concerning the rights and
duties of the parties or their remedies in event of a breach of con-
tract are without effect.0 2
C. Pennsylvania's Adoption Act
However, even if a surrogate contract were not held to violate
Pennsylvania's baby-selling statute, the contract still may be avoida-
ble under current Pennsylvania law. Pennsylvania's Adoption Act'03
provides that a mother cannot consent to the adoption of her child
within 72 hours of its birth.104 Any consent to adoption made prior
to the expiration of the 72 hour waiting period is invalid. The pur-
pose of this provision is to prevent a woman from being pressured
into giving up her baby for adoption. Theoretically, the 72 hour
waiting period allows the mother ample opportunity to make a rea-
soned decision.0 5
In a typical surrogate gestation transaction, the surrogate
mother relinquishes her parental rights in the child and consents to
its adoption by the wife of the natural father at the time the contract
is made.'06 The surrogate mother represents, at the time the agree-
ment is made, that she will not want to keep the child. Her consent
to the child's adoption prior to its birth facilitates the performance of
the contract by making it easier for the natural father and his wife
to take custody of the child for which they have contracted. Because
the contract is entered into before the surrogate mother is insemi-
nated, she is consenting to the adoption of a child who has not yet
been conceived. Therefore, her consent is given prior to the termina-
tion of the 72 hour waiting period, rendering it invalid under Penn-
sylvania's Adoption Act.1
07
101. See 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1630(A)(3d ed.
1972). "That the courts will not lend their aid to enforcement of unlawful contracts which are
founded upon transactions in violation of a public policy declared by the legislature is unques-
tionably true." Howarth v. Gilman, 365 Pa. 50, 53, 73 A.2d 655, 656 (1950).
102. "The policy of the law is clear - if the contract is for an illegal purpose, the court
may not lend its aid to enforce it, but must leave the parties where it finds them." Bauman and
Vogel, C.P.A. v. Del Vecchio, 423 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also Wernhardt
v. Koenig, 60 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (illegal contracts are not only unenforceable but
void as well); Fitzsimons v. Eagle Brewing Co., 107 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1939) (public policy
forbids an action for damages based on a breach of an illegal agreement).
103. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2101 (1982) et seq.
104. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(c) (1982) provides in part that "[n]o consent shall be
valid if it was executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of the child."
105. See Comment, Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48, 50-51 n.13 (1976).
106. See generally Brophy, supra note 25, at 268-70.
107. Supra note 103.
D. Settling A Dispute Between Parties to a Surrogate Contract
If, under existing Pennsylvania law, surrogate contracts are con-
sidered illegal or against public policy, they may be considered void
and unenforceable. 10 8 However, this rule is not absolute. 109 A court,
presented with a dispute between the parties to the contract, could
choose to resolve it using Pennsylvania statutes and common law
principles. The contract provisions that are illegal or against public
policy can be severed from the contract, and the remainder can be
used to resolve the dispute. 110
A dispute between the parties to a surrogate gestation agree-
ment may arise for several reasons. First, the surrogate mother,
against the wishes of the natural father and his wife, could decide to
terminate the pregnancy"' or could decide to engage in other types
of conduct that endanger the baby's health. "' Second, the surrogate
mother could refuse to relinquish custody of the child to the natural
father and his wife. Third, the natural father and his wife could re-
108. WILLISTON, supra note 101.
109. The interest in enforcing an illegal contract is weighed against the public policy
against enforcing it, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). See also Keane,
Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 57. A court faced with a dispute may
want to resolve it, despite the fact that the contract is considered by the court to be unenforce-
able, because the best interests of a child are at stake. One commentator contends that a
surrogate contract should not be invalidated.
The rule that contracts requiring an illegal act are unenforceable is not inflexi-
ble, and courts must look to the legislative intent before invalidating such agree-
ments. No specific legislative intent to invalidate surrogate motherhood contracts
can be shown, since such arrangements have only recently come to the attention
of the public, and courts should await explicit legislative direction before invali-
dating these voluntary agreements among adults.
Id. at 158-59.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 183 comment a (1981). Severing the
illegal provision from the remainder of the contract may not aid a court in resolving a dispute
between parties to a surrogate contract, despite the fact that it has part of the contract to
facilitate a resolution. Assume, for instance, that the surrogate mother refuses to give up the
child or the natural father and his wife refuses to accept the child. In these situations the
contract will contain no provision pertaining to the custody of the child because the illegal
consent to custody and adoption will have been severed from the contract. See supra notes
101-107 and accompanying text.
I ll. The surrogate mother may have the right to an abortion during the first trimester
of her pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But see Note, Surrogate Mothers:
The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. LAW & MED. 323 (1981) (this may be a constitutional right that
can be waived prior to its exercise). However, the author notes:
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to decide to abort is
one of constitutional dimension which cannot be limited by the exercise of state
law unless pursuant to a compelling state interest. The Court has also held that
a woman may decide to abort irrespective of her husband's consent. If a husband
cannot veto his wife's decision to abort, it is unclear whether husband and wife,
who are merely in a contractual [sic] relationship with the surrogate mother, can
impose their will.
Id. at 333 (footnotes omitted).
112. Studies have revealed that cigarettes and alcohol can be detrimental to a develop-
ing fetus. See generally ABDUL-KARIM, DRUGS DURING PREGNANCY: CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES
(1981); BRECHER, SMOKING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 39-40 (1963).
fuse to accept the child after it is born. a
1. Conduct Affecting the Baby's Welfare.-The application of
Pennsylvania statutes and common law principles to the legal and
valid portion of the contract would be inadequate to settle a dispute
between the parties. Many surrogate contracts contain provisions in
which a surrogate mother waives her right to an abortion or agrees
to refrain from cigarette, alcohol and drug use during her preg-
nancy.11' In the first type of dispute, the surrogate mother attempts
to breach this provision. If the surrogate mother decides to terminate
her pregnancy during her first trimester, she would have the right to
do so because a waiver of that right would be ineffective in the ab-
sence of a legal contract. 11 5 Therefore, prior to a determination that
the fetus is viable,"' the natural father and his wife remain power-
less to prevent the surrogate mother from having an abortion.
Similarly, a surrogate mother's agreement to abstain from con-
duct that would detrimentally affect the baby's health is unenforce-
able if the contract is illegal or against public policy. In this situa-
113. Judy Stiver agreed to act as a surrogate mother for Alexander Malahoff. The baby
was born microcephalic and mentally retarded. Malahoff refused to take the child and insisted
that blood tests be taken to determine whether he was the father. The tests revealed that
Stiver's husband was the father, not Malahoff. See Friedrich, A Legal, Moral, Social
Nightmare, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 55.
114. Surrogate contracts used by Surrogate Family Services, Inc. in Louisville, Ken-
tucky contain standard provisions in which the surrogate mother promises not to abort the
child unless the child has been determined to be physiologically abnormal or it is necessary to
preserve the physical health of the surrogate. Brophy, supra note 25, at 280. These same
surrogate contracts contain a provision in which the surrogate mother agrees to refrain from
cigarettes and alcohol, as well as illegal drugs and prescription and non-prescription medica-
tion without the written consent of a physician. Id. at 238.
115. The state may not interfere with a woman's right to have an abortion prior to a
determination that the fetus is viable. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211(a) (1982). See also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although the contract may contain a provision waiving the surro-
gate mother's right to terminate her pregnancy, it probably is not binding during the first
trimester:
It would seem clear that if the surrogate intentionally aborts, at least during the
first twelve weeks, the natural father would have no tort action ....
The contractual provision here would be little comfort to the natural father
but the abortion could relieve him of paying any medical expenses connected
with the pregnancy and the abortion, with no legal ability to prevent the abor-
tion, and with no tort action, the only remaining legal remedy for the natural
father would be breach of contract, and the possible recovery of damages. This
remedy seems to depend on whether one may promise not to exercise a constitu-
tional right and be called upon to respond in damages if the right is exercised.
Any conclusion would be pure speculation at this time.
Brophy, supra note 25, at 280-81 (citations omitted).
116. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1982) defines viability as:
That stage of fetal development when, in the judgment of the physician based on
the particular facts of the case before him and in light of the most advanced
medical technology and information available to him, there is a reasonable likeli-
hood of sustained survival of the unborn child outside the body of his or her
mother, with or without artificial support.
tion, an injunction would be an appropriate remedy.1 17 However, a
court most likely would be reluctant to enjoin the surrogate mother's
conduct. The type of activity involved is the type that would be con-
ducted within the privacy of the surrogate's home. It would be im-
practical, if not impossible, for the court to monitor the surrogate
mother's activity to ensure she is complying with the injunction. In
the absence of legislation recognizing the legality of surrogate gesta-
tion agreements, the natural father and his wife would be without an
adequate remedy if the first type of dispute should arise.
2. Determining the Paternity of the Child Under Pennsylvania
Law.-The second type of dispute arises when the surrogate mother
decides to keep the baby instead of terminating her parental inter-
ests. In this instance, the natural father and his wife bring an action
to obtain custody of the child. Before obtaining custody, the natural
father needs to establish paternity of the child. 118 However, if the
surrogate mother is married, establishing paternity in the natural fa-
ther is difficult 19 because Pennsylvania law establishes a presump-
tion that a child born during a valid marriage is the natural child of
the mother's husband.
1 20
Paternity actions typically are brought by a mother against a
putative father in an effort to obtain child support.' Under Penn-
sylvania law, a man may acknowledge paternity of a child1 22 by fil-
ing paternity acknowledgement forms with the Department of
Health accompanied by the consent under oath of the child's
mother.1 2 3 A surrogate mother who wanted to keep the child, how-
ever, could thwart the natural father's attempt to establish paternity
117. An injunction would be a desirable remedy because the natural father and his wife
want to stop the surrogate mother from continuing conduct injurious to the baby's health.
118. In custody disputes, the courts generally prefer the natural parents to third parties.
See Porch v. Porch, 327 Pa. Super. 346, 475 A.2d 831 (1984) (in a custody contest between a
parent and a third party, a parent has a prima facie right to custody which will be forfeited
only if convincing evidence is shown that the child's best interests will be served by an award
of custody to the third party); In re Custody of Scott, 288 Pa. Super. 162, 431 A.2d 338
(1981) (parents are favored over third parties in a custody dispute unless the best interests of
the child will be served by awarding custody to the third party, but the third party's burden of
proof is a heavy one); See also KRAM & FRANK, THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 93 (1982).
119. The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is a strong one.
Connell v. Connell, 329 Pa. Super. 1, 477 A.2d 872 (1984). A husband who denies paternity
must "show clear, direct, convincing, and unanswerable evidence of nonaccess, lack of sexual
intercourse or impotency. Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
120. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6137 (1982) states that blood tests may be used to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock.
121. KRAUSE, supra note 36, at 112. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6767 (1982) acknowledges
that it is the putative father who is the defendant in an action for child support. The action
may be commenced by the party to whom support is owed or by a state or political subdivision.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6742 (1982).
122. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (1982).
123. Id.
by refusing to join in the acknowledgement.12 The natural father's
acknowledgement of paternity then merely becomes a claim of pater-
nity, which does not give the natural father any rights to the child.
It is not clear whether the natural father has the right to bring
an action to establish paternity equal to the right that a mother has
to bring a paternity action against a putative father to obtain child
support. 25 The fact that the surrogate mother may have a husband
is especially troubling. One might envision a court hesitating to allow
a man to bring an action to establish himself as the father of a child
who legally already has a father.
Assuming that such a paternity action is allowed, the natural
father could encounter further difficulties. The standard of proof in a
paternity case is preponderance of the evidence12 and, in the case of
a surrogate mother refusing to relinquish the child, the burden of
proof is on the natural father. The surrogate contract, in which the
surrogate mother agrees to be artificially inseminated with the natu-
ral father's sperm, could be used by the natural father as evidence of
the surrogate mother's intent to have the natural father's child.
However, because the surrogate contract may be considered illegal,
and therefore void and unenforceable, the probative value of the in-
semination provision as evidence of the surrogate mother's intent
may be lessened by its illegality.
12 7
Non-access is a defense to a paternity action.' 28 Although the
defense is typically utilized by putative fathers, the surrogate mother
124. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8303 (1982) provides:
If the mother of the child fails or refuses to join in the acknowledgement of the
paternity provided for in section 8302 . . . the Department of Health shall index
it as a claim of paternity. The filing and indexing of a claim of paternity shall
not confer upon the putative father any rights as to the child except that the
putative father shall be entitled to notice of any proceeding brought to terminate
any parental rights as to the child.
125. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6767 (1982) seems to contemplate that paternity actions may
only be brought against a putative father. Because actions to establish paternity under 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 6704 and 6767 (1982) are brought for support purposes, it is unlikely that the
father could bring an action to establish paternity under these sections for reasons other than
to incur an obligation to pay child support. Acknowledgement of paternity under 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8302 (1982) seems to be the natural father's only recourse.
126. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6704(d) (1982).
127. A court could choose to sever that portion of the surrogate contract that provided
for the payment of a fee in exchange for the services of the surrogate mother. However, the
court then could find that the surrogate mother's promise to be artificially inseminated lacked
sufficient consideration, or that the consideration is illegal. WILLISTON, supra note 101 at §
101.
128. See, e.g., Connell v. Connell, 329 Pa. Super. 1, __, 477 A.2d 872, 875 (1984);
Commonwealth ex rel. Spangler v. Spangler, 283 Pa. Super. 190, 191, 423 A.2d 1053, 1054
(1980); Cairgle v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439
(1951). "in order to successfully rebut the presumption of legitimacy, the evidence of non-
access or lack of sexual intercourse or impotency must be clear, direct, convincing and unan-
swerable, although it is not necessary that the possibility of access be completely excluded."
Id. at 256, 77 A.2d at 442 (citations omitted).
may allege that she had never undergone insemination. 29 In the al-
ternative, she could admit to being inseminated, but could claim that
she had not refrained from sexual relations with her husband during
the period surrounding the insemination, therefore allowing the pre-
sumption of paternity to lie with her husband.1 30 Even if the physi-
cian who performed the insemination were able to testify on behalf
of the natural father to rebut the surrogate mother's testimony, he
may be reluctant to do so because he may be exposing himself to
criminal prosecution under Pennsylvania's baby-selling statute.131
Blood tests are frequently utilized in paternity cases.1 32 In re-
cent years, blood tests have been considered very reliable by the
courts in excluding a man as a possible father of a child. 33 Blood
test results that establish a man as a possible father of a child are
not conclusive, but are merely some evidence of paternity. 3 ' A natu-
ral father seeking to establish paternity through blood tests can, at
best, hope to establish himself as a possible father. Therefore, if
neither the natural father nor the husband of the surrogate mother
are excluded as possible fathers as a result of the blood tests, the
presumption of paternity remains with the surrogate mother's
husband.135
3. Determining Who Should Have Custody Under Pennsylva-
nia Law.-A natural father, whose paternity has been established,
becomes obligated to pay child support.136 The obligation does not
129. A surrogate mother's claim that she was not inseminated with the sperm of the
natural father is the equivalent of a putative father's defenseof non-access in a traditional
paternity action. Both claims, if true, make it impossible for the man involved in the paternity
action to be father of the child.
130. "Where the husband has access to the mother of the child, the presumption that he
is its father is conclusive. The fact that the wife was living in adultery was not sufficient to
destroy the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock. ... Cairgle, 366 Pa. at 256, 77 A.2d at
442 (emphasis in original).
131. Supra note 56.
132. Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6131 et
seq. (1982). 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6137 (1982) provides:
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the
court finds that the conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence
based upon the tests show that the husband is not the father of the child.
133. Note, Family Law-Paternity-Human Leukocyte Antigen Test Results are Admissi-
ble in Paternity Cases to Show the Likelihood of Paternity. Turek v. Hardy, 312 Pa. Super.
158, 458 A.2d 562 (1983), 88 DICK. L. REv. 565 (1984). "The credibility of the exclusion
method is beyond reproach in the scientific community, and most courts will accept results
indicating non-paternity as conclusive proof." Id. at 568 (footnotes omitted).
134. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held in Turek v. Hardy, 312 Pa. Super. 158, 458
A.2d 562 (1982) that H.L.A. blood tests could be used to help determine paternity. "Our
holding is limited to the conclusion that H.L.A. blood test results may be introduced as some
evidence of paternity. We do not hold this evidence as conclusive." Id. at 163, 458 A.2d at
565.
135. See supra note 130.
136. Bernstein v. Bernstein, 311 Pa. Super. 545, 457 A.2d 1316 (1983) (a parent has
the duty to support his child); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974) (the sup-
depend on whether the natural father has been granted visitation
rights to the child. 137 Nor does the fact that the natural father has
been determined to be the biological father of the child vest in him
the right to take custody of the child.138 The natural father must
bring a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain custody, 39 partial cus-
tody, 140 or visitation rights.1
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In Pennsylvania, the primary consideration in a custody dispute
is the best interest and welfare of the child. 4 ' In determining which
parent can better provide for the best interests of the child, the trend
has been to abolish the presumptions that were once used by the
courts in custody determinations. 43 A child of "tender years"' 44 is
no longer presumed to be better cared for by the mother,145 nor is a
two parent family presumed to be superior to a one parent family.' 46
The age of parents, and which parent is closer to the "natural age"
of a typical parent, are not determinative factors. 4 7 The income and
personal wealth of each parent may only be considered in a custody
dispute to determine whether either is unable to provide for the child
port of children is the equal responsibility of both the mother and father).
137. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 313 Pa. Super. 83, 459 A.2d 421 (1983).
138. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc. v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300
(1949).
139. "'[Clustody' means the legal right to keep, control, guard, care for and preserve a
child and includes the terms 'legal,' 'physical,' and 'shared custody.'" PA. R. Civ. P.
1915.1(b).
140. " '[P]artial custody' means the right to take possession of a child away from the
custodial person for a certain period of time." Id.
141. "'[V]isitation' means the right to visit a child, but does not include the right to
remove the child from the custodial person's control." Id. When a claim for custody, partial
custody, or visitation of minor children is not brought pursuant to a divorce action, then the
person making the claim must bring a habeas corpus proceeding. PA. R. Civ. P. 1915.1(a)(1).
142. Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 329 Pa. Super. 248, 478 A.2d 451 (1984)
(the best interests and permanent welfare of the child is the paramount concern in a custody
case); Brooks v. Brooks, 319 Pa. Super. 268, 466 A.2d 152 (1983) (primary consideration in a
custody dispute is the best interests of the child, including the child's physical, intellectual,
emotional, and spiritual well-being); In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 465 A.2d 614 (1983) (all other
considerations are subordinate to the concern for the best interests and permanent welfare of
the child); Tettis v. Boyum, 317 Pa. Super. 8, 463 A.2d 1056 (1983) (that the primary con-
cern in a custody dispute is the best interests of the child is well settled in Pennsylvania).
143. See Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 429, 448 A.2d
1113, 1117 (1982).
144. The "tender-years" doctrine refers to the judicial presumption that young children
should be placed with their mother because the mother's "maternal instinct" would allow her
to better care for the children than would the father. LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY 2-3 (1982).
145.
[T]he "tender years presumption" is at most merely a procedural device for allo-
cating the burden of proof. Only where a hearing judge determines, after a full
hearing, that a child's best interests would be equally served by living with either
parent, should a child of "tender years" be placed in the mother's custody.
Tobias v. Tobias, 248 Pa. Super. 168, 171, 374 A.2d 1372, 1373 (1977).
146. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. at 429, 448 A.2d at 1117.
147. The age of the parents is not determinative but should be considered in a case
where the natural parents were under the age of 50 and the foster parents were over the age of
75. In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 465 A.2d 614 (1983).
adequately.'"
An important goal of a custody determination is the continuity
and stability of the child's environment. 4 9 Because a custody dispute
as a result of a surrogate gestation transaction is likely to involve a
newborn, this consideration may be relatively unimportant. 50 How-
ever, if a stable relationship has developed between the child and the
parent who presently has custody, the court will have to weigh the
advantages and risks of disrupting that relationship. 5' The first
months of a baby's life are critical to its psychological development,
and many experts believe that, during that period, the baby should
have extensive contact with at least one of its parents so that "bond-
ing" may occur. 5 ' At the time of the custody dispute, the baby may
already have formed a psychological bond with the surrogate mother
and her husband. The existence of the psychological bond is a factor
that could weigh heavily against a determination that the natural
father be awarded custody of the child.15
Because the best interest of the child is a factual question, cus-
tody determinations are made on a case by case basis. Therefore, a
natural father who has established paternity and is trying to gain
custody of a child born to a surrogate mother cannot be guaranteed
success. A third type of dispute can arise when the natural father
and his wife refuse to accept a child born of the surrogate mother.
The surrogate would find it equally difficult, in the absence of a valid
and enforceable surrogate contract, to enforce the custody provisions.
148. Brooks v. Brooks, 319 Pa. Super. 268, 466 A.2d 152 (1983); In re Custody of
Pearce, 310 Pa. Super. 254, 456 A.2d 597 (1983).
149. Witmayer v. Witmayer, 320 Pa. Super. 372, 467 A.2d 371 (1983); In re Tremayne
Quame Idress R., 286 Pa. Super. 480, 429 A.2d 40 (1981).
150. See Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc. v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300
(1949).
A child of two years of age or under will form new attachments quickly if
treated kindly by those into whose care it is given. In that respect, it resembles a
young tree whose roots have not yet taken deep hold in the nourishing earth, but
when a child is much beyond the age of two years, it becomes strongly attached
to those who stand in parental relationship with it and who have tenderly cared
for it. Its bonds of affection have become so strong that to sunder them suddenly
may result not only in the child's unhappiness, but also in its physical injury.
Id. at 97, 66 A.2d at 306. But see In re Tremayne Quame idress R., 286 Pa. Super. 480, 429
A.2d 40 (1981). "These words, however, were written thirty-two years ago. We no longer so
lightly assume that very young children will weather drastic changes in environment without
psychological damage." Id. at 495, 429 A.2d at 48.
151. "Where the child's parents are determined to be equally fit, or nearly so, as in the
present case, the fact that a stable, long-continued and happy relationship has developed be-
tween the child and one parent may be of critical importance to the formulation of an appro-
priate custody decree." English v. English, 322 Pa. Super. 234, 240, 469 A.2d 270, 273
(1983).
152. A newborn baby becomes dependent on one or more of its parents for survival, and
as a result, a psychological bond develops between them. See, e.g., SPITZ, THE FIRST YEAR OF
LIFE (1965).
153. In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 465 A.2d 614 (1983).
Legislation recognizing the legality of the surrogate gestation trans-
action and the surrogate contract in Pennsylvania would help to alle-
viate these problems.
V. Legislative Proposals
In light of the inadequacies of Pennsylvania laws currently ap-
plicable to surrogate parenting agreements, legislation must recog-
nize and address the aspects of the surrogate arrangement that set it
apart from more conventional parent-child relationships. The guide-
lines for proposed legislation set forth in this section are in their
most general form. Ideally, legislation concerning the surrogate ges-
tation transaction should be as specific as possible so that the rights
and liabilities of the parties to the transaction are clearly delineated.
This specificity will aid the courts confronted with disputes arising
over a surrogate gestation transaction, and will avoid ambiguity and
contradiction in future case law in this area."'
A. Recognition of the Legality of the Surrogate Contract
One legislative goal should be to clarify the legality of a surro-
gate parenting contract in Pennsylvania. This would avoid the
problems that arise when a surrogate contract is found void and un-
enforceable because the transaction is considered illegal and con-
trary to the public policy of the state. With legislation that legalizes
and regulates surrogate parenting agreements, a court could accept
the surrogate contract as legally binding in resolving the dispute
rather than resorting to the case law and statutes, which are inade-
quate when applied to a surrogate gestation agreement. A written
legal contract setting forth the rights, duties, and liabilities of the
parties would greatly aid resolution of issues that have proved to be
hopelessly complex. 155 Knowing that a surrogate contract is legal
and binding in Pennsylvania may make it less likely that a party will
later attempt to breach the agreement.
To further ensure the legality of a surrogate contract, the legis-
lation should allow the surrogate mother to be reimbursed for medi-
cal expenses, legal expenses, maternity clothing, and lost wages. A
statute should provide for the payment of a fee for the surrogate's
services. 156 The legislative sanction of payment to the surrogate
154. Without specific legislation, surrogate parenting, like artificial insemination, may
become the subject of inconsistent case law. See supra note 45.
155. Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina have proposed
legislation requiring surrogate parenting agreements to be in writing. See REP. HuM. REPRO.
& L. (L-M Studies) R-79 to R-108 (1982-85).
156. The legislation should be carefully worded so that it is clear that the fee represents
reasonable compensation for the surrogate mother's services and not payment for the termina-
mother for her services negates any claim that the surrogate gesta-
tion transaction violates Pennsylvania's baby-selling statute.1 57 The
ability of a couple to pay a fee to a surrogate mother also ensures
that there will be a large number of potential surrogates . 58 The abil-
ity of a couple to select a surrogate mother from a large pool may
decrease the number of disputes between the parties to the surrogate
agreement. Because the payment of a fee could result in a greater
number of potential surrogate mothers to choose from, the chances
of finding a woman genetically compatible with the couple and phys-
ically capable of being a surrogate mother are greater.
Another goal of surrogate parenting legislation should be to pre-
scribe a maximum fee that the surrogate mother is allowed to collect
for her services. 159 A limit on fees charged by surrogate mothers
would allay concerns that government sanctioning of surrogate ges-
tation agreements, combined with potentially exorbitant fees, will
lead to the creation of a wholesale baby market. 60 Setting a maxi-
mum fee could also prevent illegal adhesion contracts, which result
when the parties to a contract occupy unequal bargaining positions.
A couple unable to have a child usually has tried all other means of
obtaining a child before trying to find a surrogate mother.' 6 ' The
surrogate mother is often their last hope of having a child. Out of
desperation, a couple might agree to pay any price to have the child
they long for. By limiting the surrogate mother's fee to an amount
representing reasonable compensation for her services, surrogate
parenting legislation would allow the adopting couple to occupy an
equal bargaining position with the surrogate mother.
Surrogate gestation transactions, although believed by some to
violate baby-selling statutes, should not be considered illegal or con-
trary to the public policy of Pennsylvania. Although a surrogate
mother often accepts payment, this does not fall within the character
of conduct intended to be prohibited by Pennsylvania's baby-selling
statute. The purpose of a statute that prohibits buying and selling
infant children is to ensure that a mother - particularly an unwed
mother who may be in financial straits - is not pressured into ter-
minating her parental interests in her baby. A woman enticed by
tion of her parental rights.
157. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (1982) supra note 56.
158. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 57, at 153.
159. Minnesota's proposed surrogate parenting legislation sets the maximum fee at
$10,000. REP. HUM. REPRO. & L. (L-M Studies) R-92 (1982-85). A Michigan legislator,
Richard Fitzpatrick, has also introduced legislation setting the maximum fee at $10,000. See
Andrews, Removing the Stigma of Surrogate Motherhood, 4 FAM. ADVOCATE, Fall 1981, at
20, 21.
160. WHITE, supra note 2, at 128. See generally Comment, Black-Market Adoptions,
22 CATH. LAw. 48 (1976).
161. KEANE, supra note 4, at 11; WHITE, supra note 14, at 126.
money into giving up her child for adoption is considered to be sell-
ing her parental rights.162 Obviously, this is against the state's policy
of protecting the best interests of the child. 6 ' The transaction fur-
ther frustrates public policy because the child is not necessarily
adopted by the parents best suited for the child, but by the parents
with the most money.""
The typical surrogate parenting arrangement is not a form of
baby-selling. A baby born as the result of a surrogate gestation
transaction is hardly unplanned, nor does it create an unexpected
financial burden for the surrogate mother. On the contrary, the baby
is conceived after careful planning. The surrogate mother has agreed
to terminate her parental interests before the baby is conceived.0 5 In
fact, the surrogate mother probably never would have agreed to be
artificially inseminated if the natural father and his wife had not
agreed to take custody of the child after it was born. Unlike the
typical baby-selling transaction, there is no opportunity for the
adopting couple to pressure the surrogate mother because the deci-
sion to become pregnant by artificial insemination rests solely with
the surrogate mother.
Pennsylvania's surrogate parenting legislation could require that
surrogate contracts contain a provision exempting surrogate gesta-
tion transactions from the required 72 hour waiting period that must
elapse before a valid consent to an adoption can be given."' The
reasons for the waiting period are similar to the reasons for prohibit-
ing the buying and selling of babies. By requiring the mother to wait
72 hours before she can consent to the adoption of her baby, the
State ensures that the mother thinks before making an irreversible
decision, thereby lessening the chances that she was pressured into
giving up her child.
Surrogate parenting transactions are different from traditional
adoptions; therefore, the 72 hour waiting period hinders the goal
sought to be achieved by the parties to surrogate contracts. Public
policy would best be served by requiring the surrogate mother and
162. This type of transaction is referred to as a black-market adoption.
163. In a black-market adoption, "Itihe priorities present in a normal adoption are com-
pletely reversed; the welfare of the baby and the natural mother are subordinated to the profit
motive of the black marketeer." Comment, supra note 160, at 50.
164.
Prospective adoptive parents need not show the marketeer that they are fit for
parenthood, but rather that they can afford the fee, which may run in excess of
$25,000. Consequently, the existence of a black market promotes a system in
which the rich often can adopt when the poor cannot, regardless of fitness.
Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted).
165. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
166. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(c) (1982) requires a 72 hour waiting period before
consent to adoption may be given. See supra note 104.
her husband to terminate their parental interests and to consent to
adoption prior to the child's conception. Then, when the child is
born, the natural father and his wife can take immediate custody of
the child. This might eliminate problems that may arise if bonding
begins to occur between the child and the surrogate mother1 17 and
decreases the likelihood that the surrogate mother and her husband
may change their minds and decide to keep the child. In a surrogate
gestation agreement, a decision by the surrogate mother and her
husband to keep the child is contrary to the desires of the natural
father and his wife. A couple desiring a child through a surrogate
mother probably would not allow a woman to act as the surrogate if
there were a possibility that she might decide to keep the child.
Therefore, having the consent of the surrogate mother and her hus-
band in writing would allow the courts to expedite a custody case
quickly should a dispute arise between the parties.
Pennsylvania's surrogate parenting legislation should expressly
state that a child born as a result of a surrogate gestation arrange-
ment is the natural and legitimate child of the natural father and his
wife.168 This provision would negate any claim that the child is ille-
gitimate because its natural mother, the surrogate mother, was artifi-
cially inseminated with the sperm of a man other than her hus-
band. 1 9 The provision would also rebut the presumption that the
surrogate mother's husband is the father of the child. The legislation
could also require that a paternity test be conducted shortly after the
baby's birth to ensure that the sperm donor is indeed the natural
father. 70 The legislation's express recognition of the child's paternity
and legitimacy is in keeping with Pennsylvania's policy in favor of
legitimacy171 and its policy of protecting the best interests of the
167. See supra note 152.
168. Proposed surrogate parenting legislation in Michigan and New York contain provi-
sions making the child born to a surrogate mother the legitimate child of the natural father
and his wife. REP. HUM. REPRO. & L. (L-M Studies) R-82, R-92 (1982-85).
169. Pennsylvania does not have legislation dealing with artificial insemination. It is
therefore unclear what the status of a child born as a result of artificial insemination would be.
170. New York's proposed surrogate parenting legislation provides:
Not later than twenty-four hours after the birth of a child born to a surrogate,
the natural father, the surrogate's husband, if the surrogate is married, and the
child shall submit to procedures necessary for the performance of blood or tissue
typing tests which tend to establish the paternity of the child, to be selected by
the natural father, and which may include, but are not limited to, tests of red
cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, and serum pro-
teins. The results of the tests performed shall be made available immediately to
the surrogate and the natural father.
REP. HUM. REPRO. & L. (L-M Studies) R-98 (1982-85).
171. 48 PA, STAT. ANN. § 167 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) provides: "That all children shall
be legitimate irrespective of the marital status of their parents and in any and every case
where children are born out of wedlock they shall enjoy all the rights and privileges as if they
had been born during the wedlock of such parents . .. .
child. 172
B. Medical and Psychological Testing
Many problems can develop during the course of a surrogate
gestation transaction. The surrogate mother may be unable to con-
ceive or carry a child to term, or she may have second thoughts
about the pregnancy that cause her to want to terminate it. The sur-
rogate mother or the natural father could carry a genetic abnormal-
ity that is transferred to the child in the form of a birth defect,
which could result in the natural father and his wife refusing to take
custody of the child. Finally, the surrogate mother could refuse to
relinquish custody of the child after it is born.
Many of these problems could be avoided if Pennsylvania's sur-
rogate parenting legislation required the parties to undergo medical
and psychological testing prior to entering into a surrogate con-
tract. 173 Mandatory screening of all parties could help ensure that
they are well suited to the surrogate gestation transaction. Prior to
the formation of a surrogate gestation contract, a physician should
certify that the potential surrogate mother is healthy, is of normal
child bearing years, is not in a high risk group,"74 and is able to
conceive and carry a baby to term. In most instances, the potential
surrogate mother will meet the certification requirements because
most experts agree that a woman who wants to become a surrogate
mother should already have had at least one healthy child.7 5 How-
ever, in those instances where pregnancy would create a risk to the
surrogate mother or the baby, the certification requirement would
remove the woman from the pool of potential surrogate mothers,
thereby helping to avoid future problems.
Pennsylvania's surrogate parenthood legislation could also re-
quire that the surrogate mother and the natural father undergo med-
ical testing to screen for genetic abnormalities or undesireable hered-
itary traits. If the potential surrogate mother did not pass the genetic
screening test to the satisfaction of the physician and the adopting
couple, the adopting couple could find another potential surrogate
mother. However, if it were discovered that the natural father was
172. See supra note 142.
173. Medical and psychological screening generally is agreed to be necessary to the suc-
cess of a surrogate parenting agreement. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 22; Note, supra note
Ill.
174. Surrogate Parenting Associates require a surrogate mother to be at least 21 years
of age. Brophy, supra note 25, at 265. Women over the age of 35 have increased risks accom-
panying their pregnancies. The risk of a ruptured uterus, miscarriage, breech birth, vascular
disease and fibroid tumors increases substantially once a woman reaches 35. WHITE, supra
note 14, at 140-41.
175. See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 25, at 265.
the carrier of a genetic defect, the adopting couple would then have
to decide whether they are willing to accept a child born with a birth
defect. If the adopting couple decided that they would be unwilling
to raise such a child, then surrogate parenting would be an unsuita-
ble method of artificial conception for them. This type of medical
screening would help eliminate the possibility that a natural father
and his wife might refuse to take custody of the child born to a sur-
rogate mother.
Psychological screening of both the surrogate mother and the
adopting parents could also be required by Pennsylvania surrogate
parenting legislation. An examination of the surrogate mother would
focus on her commitment to have a baby. If the study revealed that
there existed a possibility that she might change her mind about the
pregnancy and decide to terminate it, the woman would be elimi-
nated from consideration as a potential surrogate mother. This legis-
lative requirement could increase the likelihood that a woman who
became a surrogate mother would carry the baby to term, thus
avoiding the question of whether the state or the adopting parents,
pursuant to the surrogate contract, could deny a woman the right to
have an abortion.1
76
Psychological testing of a potential surrogate mother could fur-
ther examine whether the woman understands the difficulties and the
depression that will be involved in relinquishing her parental inter-
ests in the child." One of the reasons why women with at least one
child are preferred as surrogate mothers is because they are better
able to consider how difficult it would be to give up a child. By re-
quiring that a potential surrogate mother be determined to be emo-
tionally stable and able to comprehend the nature of the surrogate
agreement, future custody disputes might be avoided.
The natural father and his wife might also be required to un-
dergo psychological screening. The testing would examine the inten-
sity of their desire for a child. If they appeared to be unwilling to
accept anything less than a perfectly healthy baby, counselors could
recommend adoption as a more appropriate means of acquiring a
child. This same recommendation could be made if the testing re-
vealed that the wife of the natural father is capable of having chil-
dren but does not want to become pregnant because of an apprehen-
sion about pregnancy.
1 78
176. See supra notes Ill and 115.
177. See supra note 34.
178. Before enacting surrogate parenting legislation, legislators may want to consider
whether surrogate motherhood arrangements are available only to couples who cannot or
should not conceive, or whether the arrangement may be available to couples out of conve-
nience. One commentator contends that reproductive freedom necessitates surrogate gestation
arrangements to be made available to all couples. See Graham, supra note 22, at 304.
The natural father and his wife could also be examined to deter-
mine their reasons for wanting a child. If the couple is hoping that a
child will solve their marital difficulties, counseling may help them
understand that this is rarely the case. In fact, a child born as a
result of a surrogate gestation may create even greater marital ten-
sion.179 However, the infertility of one partner can create a great
deal of stress in a marriage, so in many cases the use of surrogate
parenthood as an alternative means of reproduction may strengthen
the marriage. 180 The legislative requirement of psychological screen-
ing of both potential surrogate mothers and adopting parents is im-
portant to help ensure that the parties to surrogate gestation agree-
ments are mature, dependable, and able to cope with the myriad
aspects of this delicate transaction.
C. The Rights and Liabilities of the Parties to a Surrogate
Contract
1. Who May Be a Party to a Surrogate Contract.-An ex-
press statement of who may participate in surrogate parenting agree-
ments may be another goal of surrogate parenting legislation. Be-
cause the public policy of Pennsylvania favors legitimacy, 8' the
State may want to allow only married women to act as surrogate
mothers.182 However, denying single women the right to become a
single mother arguably is a denial of a person's fundamental right to
procreate. 83 If Pennsylvania's surrogate parenting legislation con-
tained a provision legitimizing a child born to a surrogate mother
regardless of her marital status, the State's interest in legitimacy
would be adequately balanced with a single woman's right to procre-
ate. The State should also consider whether a single man or a homo-
sexual male couple would be allowed to become adopting parents.
179. The addition to the marriage of a child that was fathered by the husband, but born
to a woman other than the wife, may cause the infertile wife to feel frustrated and jealous.
180.
One of the unhappy side effects of infertility often is divorce. One divorced, in-
fertile woman relates, 'John was an only child. I so much wanted to give him a
child, to give his parents a link with posterity-to carry on the family name. I
desperately wanted a baby to share with him. He started a family, only without
me.' Another woman tearfully confides, 'If something doesn't happen to give him
encouragement, he may ask me to leave so he can find another woman who can
have a baby.'
WHITE, supra note 14, at 125-26.
181. See supra note 171.
182. Although 48 PA. STAT. ANN. § 167 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) provides that all chil-
dren are treated as legitimate, regardless of the marital status of the parents, the State never-
theless may not want to encourage single women to become pregnant by allowing them to
become surrogate mothers.
183. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
2. Remedies in Event of Breach of a Surrogate Con-
tract.-Pennsylvania's surrogate parenting legislation should define
the remedies available in the event a surrogate contract is breached.
Legislation could provide specific performance as a remedy if the
surrogate mother refuses to give up the child when it is born. Money
damages may be inadequate in this situation because of the difficulty
and inappropriateness of attempting to place a dollar value on the
child. Payment of money damages could be construed as payment
for the termination of the natural father's parental rights, in viola-
tion of Pennsylvania's baby-selling statute."" There is an additional
emotional element involved when a couple loses a long-awaited child;
in this situation, money damages would prove an inadequate remedy.
If the natural father and his wife refuse to accept the child after
it is born, the surrogate mother may decide either to raise the child
or to put the child up for adoption. Surrogate parenting legislation
should provide that the surrogate mother who decides to raise the
child is entitled to support payments from the natural father even
though she did not mitigate her damages. 1 5 Alternatively, if the sur-
rogate mother decides to put the child up for adoption, the legisla-
tion should require the natural father and his wife to pay the adop-
tion costs. Specific performance may not be an appropriate remedy
in this situation because money damages would be adequate to com-
pensate the surrogate mother. Furthermore, the best interests of the
child may not be served by forcing the child on unwilling parents.
3. The Child's Right to Know the Identity of the Surrogate
Mother.-Pennsylvania's surrogate parenting legislation should dic-
tate whether the identity of the surrogate mother should remain
anonymous. It can be argued that a child born to a surrogate
mother, like an adoptee, has a constitutional right to know his iden-
tity. 8 Arguably, however, the surrogate mother, in the interest of
privacy, may want to protect her privacy by having her identity kept
secret. 187
Failure to address this issue in surrogate parenting legislation
could give rise to troublesome questions. If the parties to a surrogate
184. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (1982), supra note 56.
185. When a contract is breached, the innocent party has a duty to mitigate her dam-
ages when it is reasonable to do so. However, it would be unreasonable to require a surrogate
mother to place the child up for adoption in order to mitigate damages. Note, supra note Ill,
at 339 n.75.
186. See supra notes 85 and 86 and accompanying text. See generally Comment,
Adoptee's Right to Know Identity-A Ninth Amendment Approach to the Sealed Birth Certifi-
cate Statute, 27 S.D.L. REV. 122 (1982).
187. Giving up the child may be difficult for the surrogate mother, and the possibility
that the child may reenter her life at any time could prove stressful in her personal life. See
supra note 84.
gestation agreement remain anonymous, there exists the possibility
that marriages within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity could
take place between the parties' offspring.' 88 New York's proposed
surrogate parenting legislation has addressed this issue by providing
that a child born as the result of a surrogate parenting arrangement
may learn the surrogate mother's identity upon reaching eighteen
years of age.'8 9 Legislation providing for thorough record-keeping
and the right to learn the identity of the surrogate mother, unless she
has requested otherwise, when the child reaches majority, may help
to resolve some of these problems before they arise.
VI. Conclusion
The surrogate parenting arrangement is becoming an increas-
ingly popular method of artificial conception for infertile couples.
Despite its emerging prevalence, however, the transaction is fraught
with legal questions. Without legislation legalizing the transaction, a
surrogate contract may be held void and unenforceable because it
violates baby-selling statutes and adoption laws. The fact that a
child born to a surrogate mother may be considered illegitimate or of
uncertain paternity creates further problems.
Because these questions go to the very heart of our concept of
family, legislation is needed to resolve these problems in a uniform
manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child. Penn-
sylvania's surrogate parenting legislation should legalize the transac-
tion and address the issues of who may enter into a surrogate parent-
ing agreement and what fee, if any, may be paid to a surrogate
mother. Legislation clearly defining the rights and liabilities of the
parties to a surrogate contract may help prevent many future
heartaches.
Lizabeth A. Bitner
188. If the parties remain anonymous, there exists the possibility that a child of the
surrogate mother and her husband could marry the child of the surrogate mother and the
natural father. Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge For Family Law, 69 VA. L.
REv. 465, 497-98 (1983). Marriages between brothers and sisters of the half-blood are prohib-
ited. 48 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1-5(i) (Purdon 1965).
189. REP. HUM. REPRO. & L. (L-M Studies) R-98 (1982-85).

